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Abstract
Classical game-theoretic approaches for multi-agent systems in both the forward
policy learning/design problem and the inverse reward learning problem often
make strong rationality assumptions: agents are perfectly rational expected utility
maximizers. Specifically, the agents are risk-neutral to all uncertainties, maximize
their expected rewards, and have unlimited computation resources to explore such
policies. Such assumptions, however, substantially mismatch with many observed
humans’ behaviors such as satisficing with sub-optimal policies, risk-seeking and
loss-aversion decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of bounded
risk-sensitive Markov Game (BRSMG) and its inverse reward learning problem.
Instead of assuming unlimited computation resources, we consider the influence of
bounded intelligence by exploiting iterative reasoning models in BRSMG. Instead
of assuming agents maximize their expected utilities (a risk-neutral measure), we
consider the impact of risk-sensitive measures such as the cumulative prospect
theory. Convergence analysis of BRSMG for both the forward policy learning and
the inverse reward learning are established. The proposed forward policy learning
and inverse reward learning algorithms in BRSMG are validated through a navi-
gation scenario. Simulation results show that the behaviors of agents in BRSMG
demonstrate both risk-averse and risk-seeking phenomena, which are consistent
with observations from humans. Moreover, in the inverse reward learning task, the
proposed bounded risk-sensitive inverse learning algorithm outperforms a baseline
risk-neutral inverse learning algorithm by effectively recovering not only the more
accurate rewards but also the intelligence levels and the risk-measure parameters of
agents given demonstrations of their interactive behaviors. Therefore, the proposed
BRSMG framework provides a tool to learn interpretable and heterogeneous human
behavior models which are of critical importance in human-robot interactions.
1 Introduction
Markov Game (MG), as an approach to model interactions and decision-making processes of in-
telligent agents in multi-agent systems, dominates in many domains, from economics [1] to games
[25], and to human-robot/machine interaction [3, 8]. In classical MGs, all agents are assumed to be
perfectly rational in obtaining their interaction policies. For instance, in a two-player Markov Game,
at each step t, agent 1 is assumed to make decisions based on his/her belief in agent 2’s behavioral
model in which agent 2 is also assumed to behave according to his/her belief in agent 1’s model
. . . and both agents are maximizing their expected rewards based on the infinite levels of mutual
beliefs. If the beliefs match the actual models, perfect Markov strategies of all agents may be found
by solving the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game where a Nash equilibrium is reached.
Under such assumptions, we can either explore humans’ optimal strategies with pre-defined rewards
(forward policy learning/design) or perform the inverse learning problem in which we aim to recover
humans’ reward structures by observing their behaviors based on, for instance, the maximum entropy
inverse reinforcement learning [40].
However, real human behaviors often significantly deviate from such “perfectly rational” assumptions
from two major aspects [9]. First, mounting evidence has shown that rather than spending a great
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amount of effort to hunt for the best choice, humans often choose actions that are satisfying (i.e.,
actions that are above their pre-defined thresholds according to certain criteria) and relatively quick
and easy to find. Simon [27] formulated such a decision-making strategy as bounded rationality.
Among the many developed models to capture such bounded rationality, iterative human reasoning
models from behavioral game theory [4] are one of the most prominent paradigms. These models
do not assume humans perform infinite layers of strategic thinking during interactions but model
humans as agents with finite levels of intelligence (rationality). Second, instead of optimizing the
risk-neutral expected rewards, humans demonstrate strong tendency towards risk-sensitive measures
when evaluating the outcomes of their actions under uncertainties. They are risk-seeking in terms
of gains and risk-averse for losses. For example, people often prefer a choice with high reward but
low probability over the one with low reward but high probability although the latter has a higher
expected value. Humans also have stronger motivations to avoid losses than to obtain gains [34].
Such deviations make modeling real humans’ interactive behaviors using classical MGs very difficult.
In this work, we aim to establish a new game-theoretic framework, i.e., the bounded risk-sensitive
Markov Game (BRSMG) framework that considers the two aspects of realistic human behaviors
discussed above. The integration of bounded rationality and risk-sensitive measure have failed the
well-established Nash equilibrium strategies, and fundamental questions such as the convergence of
policy learning and reward learning have to be re-visited and proved. Hence, our goal is to develop
general solutions to both the forward policy learning/design problem and inverse reward learning
problem in general BRSMG framework.
More specifically, in the forward strategy learning/design problem, rather than introducing additional
computational costs to agents’ actions as in [2], we model humans’ cognitive limitations and biases
by adopting the iterative human reasoning models, i.e., humans’ strategic reasoning is not of infinite
layers, but rather iterative and finite. Moreover, to model the influence of humans’ risk sensitivity,
we study agents’ optimal policies in terms of maximizing their cumulative prospects rather than the
expected utilities according to the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [34]. In the inverse reward
learning problem, we develop a bounded risk-sensitive inverse learning algorithm which can recover
not only the nominal rewards of agents but also the intelligence levels and the parameters in their risk
measures directly from their demonstrated behaviors, with no prior information on their intelligence
levels. To our best knowledge, our work is the first to consider both bounded rationality and
risk-sensitivity in general-sum MGs for both the forward and the inverse problems.
Figure 1: Modeling interactions between humans as
bounded risk-sensitive Markov Games: two human
agents (orange and blue) plan to exit the room through
specified doors without collisions with obstacles and
each other. We aim to answer two questions: 1) as-
suming both humans have bounded level of strategic
reasoning and risk-sensitive performance measures, how
will their optimal policies differ from that of classical
MGs? and 2) what algorithms can recover the rewards
and sensitivity parameters given their trajectories?
Contribution. In summary, the contribution of
our work is three-fold: 1) we proposed a novel
game-theoretic framework, BRSMG, that cap-
tures the bounded rationality and risk-sensitivity
in humans’ reasoning processes; 2) the proposed
framework makes the first attempt to establish a
bridge between inverse reward learning and risk-
aware iterative reasoning models in behavioral
game theory; 3) in contrast to the previous risk-
neutral reward learning algorithms that learn the
nominal rewards under equilibrium solution con-
cepts, we exploit an alternative paradigm based
on non-equilibrium solution concepts and offer
a solution that learns not only the rewards but
also the intelligence levels and the risk-sensitive
measure parameters. Therefore, our solution
provides an interpretable and heterogeneous hu-
man behavior model which is of critical impor-
tance in human-robot interactions.
2 Related Work
Bounded rationality. The influence of bounded rationality in the forward strategy design problem has
attracted researchers’ attentions in both single-agent and multi-agent settings. One group of studies
formulate such influence by introducing additional computation costs to agents’ actions, such as [2],
[11] and [12]. Another group focuses on models that can explicitly capture the bounded reasoning
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process of humans. Examples include the Boltzmann rationality model [35], the quantal response
equilibrium solution (QRE) [21], and various iterative reasoning models such as the level-k framework
[7], the cognitive hierarchy model [5], and the quantal level-k model [29] in multi-agent setting. The
Boltzmann and QRE model formulate all irrational behaviors of humans via sub-optimality, while
iterative reasoning models emphasize more on the reasoning depths of humans. Instead of assuming
all agents perform infinite levels of (circular) strategic reasoning, iterative reasoning models assume
that humans can only perform a finite number of iterations of reasoning. Applications of all the such
models can be found in many domains, including normal-form zero-sum games [32], aerospace [38],
cyber-physical security [15, 16], and human-robot interaction applications [18, 8, 33]. It is proven
in [36] that compared to QRE, the iterative reasoning models can achieve better performance in
predicting human behaviors in simultaneous move games. More specifically, [37] showed that the
quantal level-k model is the state-of-the-art among various iterative reasoning models.
Risk measure. Many risk measures have been developed to model how decisions should be made
under uncertainties beyond expectation. Value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-Risk (CVaR)
[22] are two well-adopted risk measures. In addition, the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [34]
also formulates a model that can well explain a substantial amount of human risk-sensitive behaviors
that are beyond the scope of expected utility theory, and has been verified in many domains. In the
light of the above risk measure models, many risk-sensitive decision-making and reward learning
algorithms have been proposed for single-agent settings, such as [19, 6, 13, 17] for decision-making
and [20, 23] for inverse reward learning. In [30], the authors studied the inverse reward learning
problem in a multi-agent setting via a Stackelberg Game [26] where a leader-follower formulation
(ego agent is assumed to be the leader from his/her own perspective in the game) was assumed during
the risk-sensitive inverse learning process. However, such a leader-follower formulation assumes all
agents as homogeneous agents and thus can not capture the diversity of humans in terms of their
reasoning capabilities.
Inverse reward learning in multi-agent games. The inverse reward learning problem in multi-agent
games have also recently attracted researchers’ attention. [39] first adopted the quantal response
equibrium concept to model the interactions among agents and developed a maximum-entropy multi-
agent inverse reinforcement learning algorithm. [10] further extended the idea for better efficiency
and scalability by introducing a latent space in the reward network. However, the multi-agent reward
learning problem with iterative reasoning models and CPT risk measure has never been addressed. In
this work, we propose the BRSMG framework to fill the gap.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Classical Markov Game
In classical two-player MGs, each agent is represented by a Markov decision process (MDP). We
denote a MG as G , 〈P,S,A,R, T , γ˜〉, whereP={1, 2} is the set of agents in the game, S=S1×S2
and A=A1 ×A2 are, respectively, the joint state and action spaces of the two agents,R=(R1, R2)
is the set of agents’ one-step reward functions with Ri : S × Ai × A−i → R, T : S × A → S
represents the state transition of the game (we consider deterministic state transitions in this paper),
−i = P \ {i} represents the opponent of agent i, and γ˜ is the reward discount factor that shared by
both agents.
We let pii : S → Ai denote a deterministic policy of agent i. At step t, given current state st,
each agent in classic MGs is trying to find the optimal action that maximizes his/her expected total
discounted rewards. Namely, the optimal policy pi∗,i is given by pi∗,i= arg maxpii V i,pi
i
(st), where
V i,pi
i
(st) = Epi−i
[∑∞
τ=0 γ˜
τRi(st+τ , a
i
t+τ , a
−i
t+τ )
]
represents the value function at st, i.e., the
expected return starting from st under policy pii with uncertainties on the estimate of the opponent’s
policy pi−i. The notations a−it+τ and st+τ , respectively, represent the predicted future action of the
opponent and the corresponding state at step t+ τ . At the MPE, both agents achieve their optimal
policies. Due to the mutual influence between the value functions of both agents, finding the MPE
policies is typically of an NP-hard problem.
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3.2 Quantal level-k model in iterative reasoning models
The quantal level-k model is one of the most effective iterative reasoning models in predicting human
behaviors in simultaneous move games [37]. It assumes that each human agent has an intelligence
level that defines his/her reasoning capability. More specifically, the level-0 agents do not perform any
strategic reasoning, while agents with higher levels of intelligence (k ≥ 1) make strategic decisions
by treating other agents as quantal level-(k−1) agents and forming their quantal best response to
the predicted quantal level-(k−1) policies. As shown in Fig. 1, the orange agent is a level-1 agent
and he believes that the blue agent is a level-0 agent. Meanwhile, the blue agent, which is in fact a
level-2 agent, believes the orange one as a level-1 agent while moving. The quantal level-k model has
therefore reduced the complex circular strategic thinking in classical MGs to finite levels of iterative
optimizations. With an anchoring level-0 policy, policies under different rationality levels, namely,
k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , can be sequentially and iteratively solved for each agent. Moreover, experiment
results in the p-beauty contest game found that the average intelligence levels for human is k = 1.5,
and over 80% people do, at most, two reasoning steps, i.e., kmax = 2 [28].
3.3 Cumulative prospect theory
The cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is a non-expected utility theory proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky in [14] to describe the risk-sensitivity of humans’ decision-making processes. It can
explain many systematic biases of human behaviors deviating from risk-neutral decisions such as
risk-avoiding, risk-seeking, and framing effects [14].
Definition 1 (CPT value). For a random variable X , the CPT value of X is defined by
1. If X is continuous, then
CPT(X)=
∫ ∞
0
w+
(
P
(
u+(X−x0) > y)) dy− ∫ ∞
0
w−
(
P
(
u−(X−x0) > y)) dy. (1)
2. If X is discrete satisfying
∑n
i=−m P(X=xi)=1, xi≥x0 for i=0, · · ·, n, and xi<x0 for
i=−m, · · ·,−1 , then
CPT(X)=
∑n
i=0
ρ˜+ (P (X=xi))u
+(X − x0)−
∑−1
i=−m
ρ˜− (P (X=xi))u
−(X − x0), (2a)
ρ˜+ (P (X=xi)) =
[
w+
(∑n
j=i
P(X=xj)
)
−w+
(∑n
j=i+1
P(X=xj)
)]
, (2b)
ρ˜− (P (X=xj)) =
[
w−
(∑i
j=−m
P(X=xj)
)
−w−
(∑i−1
j=−m
P(X=xj)
)]
. (2c)
The functions w+ : [0, 1]→[0, 1] and w− : [0, 1]→[0, 1] are two continuous non-decreasing functions
which are referred as the probability decision weighting functions. They describe the characteristics
of humans to deflate high probabilities and inflate low probabilities. The two functions u+ : R→R+
and u− : R→R+ are concave utility functions which are, respectively, monotonically non-decreasing
and non-increasing. The notation x0 denotes a “reference point" that separates the value X into gains
(X≥x0) and losses (X<x0). Handling gains and losses separately is a key feature of the CPT model
and it captures the different preferences of humans towards gains and losses. Moreover, the slope of
u− is usually larger than that of u+ to show that humans weigh losses more than gains. Without loss
of generality, we set x0 = 0 and omit x0 in the rest of this paper. Note that when both the probability
weighting functions and the utility functions take the identity function, i.e., w+=w−=u+=u−=1,
the CPT value in (1) and (2) reduces to E[X+]−E[X−], showing the connection to the expected
value, i.e., the risk-neutral performance measure.
Many experimental studies have shown that representative functional forms for u and w are:
u+(x)=(x)α if x≥0, and u+(x)=0 otherwise; u−(x)=λ(−x)β if x<0, and u−(x)=0 otherwise;
w+(p)= p
γ
(pγ+(1−p)γ)1/γ and w
−(p) = p
δ
(pδ+(1−p)δ)1/δ . The parameters α, β, γ, δ∈(0, 1] are model
parameters. We adopt these two representative functions in this paper, and focus on the discrete-
domain of CPT value in (2). Section 1 of the supplementary material illustrates the probability
weighting functions and the utility functions.
4 Bounded Risk-Sensitive Markov Game
As discussed in Section 1, classical MGs implicitly assume: 1) all agents are risk-neutral, i.e., they are
maximizing their expected utilities under uncertainties, and 2) all agents are unbounded in terms of
their intelligence levels and computation resources. In this section, we investigate the agents’ policies
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in a new general-sum two-player MG, where each agent is bounded-rational with a risk-sensitive
performance measure.
4.1 Bounded risk-sensitive policies
According to the quantal level-k model in Section 3.2, agents in the bounded risk-sensitive Markov
Games are of finite-level intelligence. Specifically, if agent i is assumed to have intelligence level-k,
k ∈ N+, then he/she believes that the opponent player is of level-(k−1), and forms his/her own
quantal level-k policies. To solve for the risk-sensitive quantal level-k policy pi∗,i,k, we start with
defining a level-0 policy as the anchoring policy.
Definition 2 (The anchoring policy of level-0 agents). We define the level-0 policy as the anchoring
policy. The level-0 policy is an uncertain-following policy. Namely, at time step t, given state st and
the action a−i from the opponent agent (i.e., the leader), the stochastic policy of a level-0 agent i
satisfes
pii,0(st, a
i|a−i) = exp
(
Ri(st, a
i, a−i)
)∑
a′∈Ai exp
(
Ri(st, a′, a−i)
) ,∀ai ∈ Ai. (3)
Note that we exploit the uncertain-following policy as the level-0 policy for the purpose of illustrating
the proposed framework. The selection of level-0 policy can be changed in different application
domains, for instance, rule-based policies have been used as the level-0 policies in [18, 33], and [31]
discussed the influences of different rule-based policies for interactive planning.
With the anchoring policy defined, we can start the iterative process to solve for the optimal policies
under higher levels of intelligence.
First, based on the CPT model defined in (2), given current state st, a quantal level-k agent i tries to
maximize the following discounted future cumulative prospects:
max
pii,k
Jpii,k (st) = max
pii,k
CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Ri(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) + γ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Ri(st+1, a
i
t+1, a
−i
t+1) + . . .
]]
, (4)
where pi∗,−i,k−1 : S ×A−i → [0, 1] denotes the optimal risk-sensitive quantal level-(k − 1) policy
of agent −i, whose level of intelligence is believed to be (k−1) from agent i’s perspective. The
action a−it+τ denotes the predicted action of agent i sampled from pi
∗,−i,k−1 at time step t+τ .
We let pi∗,i,k denote the optimal risk-sensitive quantal level-k policy of agent i, and define
V ∗,i,k(st) , Jpi∗,i,k(st) in (4) as the optimal CPT value at st. It represents the optimal CPT
value that agent i could collect in the future if he/she executes the optimal policy pi∗,i,k. Therefore,
similar to classical MGs, according to (4), the optimal CPT value at any s ∈ S satisfies [24, 19]:
V ∗,i,k(s) = max
ai∈Ai
CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Ri(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,k(s′)
]
, s′ = Ta−i∼pi∗,−i,k−1(s, ai, a−i). (5)
Also, at state s, we define the optimal value of agent i induced by taking action ai as its opti-
mal CPT Q-value, i.e., Q∗,i,k(s, ai)=CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Ri(s, ai, a−i)+γ˜V ∗,i,k(s′)
]
. Apparently, we
have V ∗,i,k(s)= maxai Q∗,i,k(s, ai), similar to classical MGs. Based on such definitions and the
Boltzmann model [35], the optimal policy pi∗,i,k for all k≥1 can be written as
pi∗,i,k(s, ai) =
exp
(
βQ∗,i,k(ai, s)
)∑
a′∈Ai exp
(
βQ∗,i,k(a′, s)
) , ∀s ∈ S, ∀ai ∈ Ai, (6)
where β≥0 defines the level of the agents conforming to the optimal strategy. We set β=1.
Next, we need to find the optimal quantal level-k risk-sensitive policy pi∗,i,k by solving (5) and (6)
for i ∈ P with k = 1, 2, . . . in an iterative way.
4.2 The convergence of bounded risk-sensitive policies
Theorem 1. Define the tuple 〈s, ai, a−i〉:=ca−is,ai and normalize the transformed probabilities
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai):=ρ˜
i(P(a−i|s, ai)) by
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai) =
{
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai)/maxai
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai), if k = 1,
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai)/
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai), otherwise.
(7)
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For an arbitrary agent i∈P , if the one-step reward Ri is lower-bounded by Rmin with Rmin ≥ 1, then∀s ∈ S and all intelligence levels with k=1, 2, · · · , the dynamic programming problem in (5) can be
solved by the following value iteration algorithm:
V i,km+1(s) = max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(Ri(s, ai, a−i)+γ˜V i,km (s′)), s′ = T (s, ai, a−i). (8)
Moreover, as m→∞, V i,km+1 converges to the optimal value function V ∗,i,k(s).
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction. For k=1, pi∗,−i,k−1=pi−i,0 in Definition 2, and with (7),
(5) reduces to a single-agent policy optimization problem where the value iteration algorithm can be
proved for convergence. Then we prove that for any level k>1, pi∗,−i,k−1 is known a priori and does
not depend on ai, which again reduces (5) into a single-agent policy optimization problem. More
details are given in Section 2 of the supplementary material. 
The algorithm in Theorem 1 is summarized in Algorithm 1, where the notation B denotes a CPT-based
Bellman operator and is defined as: BV i,km = V i,km+1.
5 The Inverse Reward Learning Problem
Algorithm 1: Compute the bounded risk-sensitive
policies
Input: Markov Game model G, highest intelligence
level kmax, and the anchoring policy pi0.
Output: {pi∗,i,k}, i ∈ P and k = 1, . . . , kmax.
Initialize k = 1;
while k ≤ kmax do
for i ∈ P do
Initialize V i,k(s),∀s ∈ S;
while V i,k not converged do
for s ∈ S do
V i,k(s)← BV i,k(s);
end for
end while
for (s, ai) ∈ S ×Ai do
Compute pi∗,i,k(s, ai) based on (6);
end for
end for
k ← k + 1;
end while
Return {pi∗,i,k}, i ∈ P and k ∈ K.
In Section 4, we investigate the forward pol-
icy learning problem of agents in BRSMGs. In
this section, we consider the inverse problem,
that is, inferring agents’ reward functions, their
risk-sensitive parameters and their levels of in-
telligence from their interactive behaviors.
5.1 Problem formulation
In the inverse reward learning problem, we
are given demonstrated trajectories of two in-
teracting agents who are running the policies
in BRSMGs. We do not know a priori their
intelligence levels. We let x0=0 as the ref-
erence point in CPT, and consider the risk
behaviors induced by the weighting function
w+(p)=pγ/ (pγ+(1−p)γ)1/γ specified via γ.
Moreover, we assume that the one-step
rewards for both agents can be linearly pa-
rameterized by a group of selected features:
∀i∈P, Ri(s, ai, a−i)=(ωi)ᵀΦi(s, ai, a−i),
where Φi(s, ai, a−i):S×Ai×A−i→Rd is a known feature function that maps a game state s, an
action of agent i, and an action of agent −i to a d-dimensional feature vector, and ωi∈Rd is a
d-dimensional reward parameter vector.
Under such circumstances, we define ω¯=(γ¯, ω¯r), where γ¯=(γi, γ−i) and ω¯r=(ωi, ω−i), respectively,
represent the parameters in the weighting functions and reward functions of both agents. Thus, given
a set of demonstrated trajectories from the two players in a BRSMG denoted by D={ξ1, · · ·, ξM}
with ξ={(s0, a¯0), . . . , (sN−1, a¯N−1)}, st∈S , and a¯t∈A (t=0, . . ., N−1), the inverse problem aims
to retrieve the underlying reward parameters and risk-sensitive parameter, i.e., ω¯, from D. Based
on the principle of Maximum Entropy as in [40], the problem is equivalent to solving the following
optimization problem:
max
ω¯
∑
ξ∈D
log P (ξ|ω¯) = max
ω¯
∑
ξ∈D
log
∏N−1
t=0
P(a¯t|st, ω¯), (9)
where P(a¯t|st, ω¯) is the joint likelihood of agents’ actions conditioned on states and parameters. We
solve this optimization problem via gradient ascent. First, we need to find out its gradient.
5.2 Gradient of the log-likelihood of a demonstration
The log-likelihood of a joint trajectory ξ is given as follows:
log P(ξ|ω¯)=
∑N−1
t=0
log
∑
(ki,k−i)∈K×K
pi∗,i,k
i
ω¯ (st, a
i
t)pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ (st, a
−i
t )P(k
i|ξt−1, ω¯)P(k−i|ξt−1, ω¯), (10)
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where pi∗,i,k
i
ω¯ and pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ , respectively, represent the risk-sensitive quantal level-k policies of agent
i and agent −i parameterized by ω¯. The probability P(k|ξt−1, ω¯), k ∈ K, is the posterior belief
in an agent’s intelligence level based on the joint trajectory history ξt−1 upon time t−1. Note that
initially, we set P(k|ξ−1, ω¯) as an uniform distribution on K. Therefore, P(k|ξt−1, ω¯) can be updated
recursively from t = 0 via:
P(k|ξt, ω¯) = pi
∗,i,k
ω¯ (st, a
i
t)P(k|ξt−1, ω¯)∑
k′∈K pi
∗,i,k′
ω¯ (st, a
i
t, )P(k′|ξt−1, ω¯)
. (11)
Intuitively, (10) and (11) mean that without prior knowledge on the intelligence level of each agent,
we need to update the beliefs in the roles of both human agents simultaneously as we evaluate the
likelihood of a joint trajectory, given parameter set ω¯.
From (10) and (11), we can see that the gradient ∂ logP(ξ|ω¯)/∂ω¯ depends on two items (details are
in Section 3 of the supplementary material): 1) the gradients of both agents’ policies under arbitrary
rationality level k∈K with respect to ω¯, i.e., ∂pi∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯, and 2) the gradient of the posterior belief of
k with respect to ω¯, i.e., ∂ logP(k|ξt−1, ω¯)/∂ω¯.
5.2.1 Gradients of policies
Recalling (6), ∂pi∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯, ∀i∈P and k∈K, requires the gradient of the corresponding optimal
Q function with respect to ω¯, i.e., ∂Q∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯. Due to the max operator in (5), direct differ-
entiation is not feasible. Hence, we use a smooth approximation for the max function, that is,
max(x1, · · ·, xnx)≈
(∑nx
i=1(xi)
κ
) 1
κ with all xi>0. The parameter κ>0 controls the approximation
error, and when κ→∞, the approximation becomes exact. Therefore, (5) can be re-written as
V ∗,i,kω¯ (s) = maxai∈AiQ
∗,i,k
ω¯ (s, a
i) ≈
(∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1κ
. (12)
Taking derivative of both sides of (12) with respect to ω¯ yields (note that (·)′ω¯ := ∂(·)ω¯∂ω¯ )
V
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ (s)≈ 1κ
(∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1−κκ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
κ
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
·Q′,∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
]
, (13a)
Q
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ (s, a
i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
∂ρiω¯
∂ω¯
(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(Riω¯(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s′))
+ ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai)α
(
Riω¯(s, a
i, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s
′)
)α−1(∂Riω¯
∂ω¯
(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ (s
′)
))
. (13b)
We can see that in (13), V
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ is in a recursive format. Hence, we propose below a dynamic
programming algorithm to solve for V
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ and Q
′,∗,i,k
ω¯ at all state and action pairs.
Theorem 2. If the one-step reward Ri, i ∈ P , is bounded by Ri∈[Rmin, Rmax] satisfying RmaxR2−αmin αγ˜<1,
then ∂V ∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯ can be found via the following value gradient iteration:
V
′,i,k
ω¯,m+1(s) ≈
1
κ
(∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1−κκ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
κ
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
·Q′,i,kω¯,m(s, ai)
]
, (14a)
Q
′,i,k
ω¯,m(s, a
i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
∂ρiω¯
∂ω¯
(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(Ri(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s′))
+ ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai)α
(
Riω¯(s, a
i, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s
′)
)α−1(∂Riω¯
∂ω¯
(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V
′,i,k
ω¯,m (s
′)
))
. (14b)
Moreover, the algorithm converges to ∂V ∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯ as m→∞.
Proof. We first define ∇BV ′,i,km = V
′,i,k
m+1, and show that the operator ∇B is a contraction under
the given conditions (derivations of ∂ρiω¯/∂ω¯ are shown in Section 3 of the supplementary material).
Then, the statement is proved by induction similar to Theorem 1. More details are given in Section 4
of the supplementary material. 
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5.2.2 Gradient of the posterior belief
The second gradient that we need to compute is the gradient of the posterior belief of k with respect
to ω¯, i.e., ∂ logP(k|ξt−1, ω¯)/∂ω¯. Recalling the definition of the posterior belief over k in (11), we
have ∂ logP(k|ξt−1, ω¯)/∂ω¯ depending on ∂pi∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯(st−1, ait−1) and ∂ logP(k|ξt−2, ω¯)/∂ω¯ for
all k∈K. Substituting the gradients of policies developed in Section 5.2.1 yields a recursive format
from time 0 to time t− 1 which can then be easily computed.
5.3 Parameter learning algorithm
Algorithm 2: Compute gradient of the
bounded risk-sensitive policies
Input: Markov Game model G, highest
intelligence level kmax, and pi∗,i,k, i ∈ P and
k = 1, . . . , kmax.
Output:{ ∂pi
∗,i,k
ω¯
∂ω¯
}, i ∈ P and k ∈ K.
Initialize k = 1;
while k ≤ kmax do
for i ∈ P do
Initialize V
′,i,k
ω¯ (s), ∀s ∈ S;
while V
′,i,k not converged do
for s ∈ S do
V
′,i,k(s)← ∇BV ′,i,k(s);
end for
end while
for (s, ai) ∈ S ×Ai do
Compute ∂pi
i,k
ω¯
∂ω¯
(s, ai) by
differentiating Eq. (6) with
respect to ω;
end for
end for
end while
Return { ∂pi
i,k
ω¯
∂ω¯
}, i ∈ P and k ∈ K.
We summarize the value iteration algorithm that com-
putes the policy gradient in Algorithm 2. Based on this,
the gradient ascent algorithm is used to find local opti-
mal parameters ω¯ that maximize the log-likelihood of
the demonstrated joint behaviors of agents in BRSMG.
The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3.
6 Experiment
In this section, we utilize a navigation example to verify
the proposed algorithms in both the forward policy de-
sign and inverse reward learning problems in BRSMG.
The simulation setup is shown in Fig. 1. Two human
agents (blue and orange) in a room are required to exit
the room through two different doors while avoiding
the obstacles in the environment and potential collisions
with each other. We assume that the two agents move
simultaneously and there is no communication between
them, but they can well observe the actions and states
of each other in the previous time step. Moreover. We
let kmax = 2 in this experiment since psychology studies
found that most humans perform at most two layers of
strategic thinking [28].
6.1 Environment setup
We define the state as s=(x1, y1, x2, y2), where xi and
yi denote the coordinates of the human agent i, i∈P .
The two agents share a same action set A={move left,move right,move up,move down}.
At each state, the reward of agent i includes two elements: navigation rewards and safety rewards
which reflect, respectively, how close the agent is to the target door and how safe it is with respect to
collisions with obstacles or the other agent. We restrict all rewards to be positive, satisfying Rmin=1,
namely, if a collision happens, an agent will collect only a fixed reward of 1. If there is no collision,
then agents can receive rewards greater than 1 according to the navigation rewards. The navigation
rewards are set as shown in Fig. 2: the highest rewards will be collected if the agents reach the doors.
6.2 The foward problem: interactions in Bounded Risk-Sensitive Markov Games
In this section, we investigate the influence of the risk-sensitive performance measure to agents’
policies in Markov Game by comparing the interactive behaviors of agents under risk-neutral and
risk-sensitive policies. We set the parameters in the CPT model as γ1,2=0.5 and α1,2=0.7. Three
cases are considered: Case 1 - both agents are quantal level-1 (L1-L1); Case 2 - both agents are
quantal level-2 (L2-L2); and Case 3 - one agent is quantal level-1 and the other is quantal level-2
(L1-L2). If both agents exit the environment without collisions and dead-locks, we call it a success.
We compare the rate of success (RS) of each case under risk-neutral and risk-sensitive policies in 100
simulations with agents starting from different locations.
First, let us see how a risk-neutral agent behaves under different levels of intelligence. Based on
the anchoring policy (level-0) in Definition 2 in Section 4.1, a risk-neutral quantal level-1 agent
will behave quite aggressively since it believes that the other agent is an uncertain-follower. On the
contrary, a risk-neutral quantal level-2 agent will perform more conservatively because it believes
that the other agent is aggressively executing a quantal level-1 policy. Fig. 3(b) shows an exemplary
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trajectory of Case 1. We can see that with two level-1 agents, collision happened due to their
aggressiveness, i.e., they both assumed that the other would yield. On the other hand, Fig. 3(d) and
Fig. 3(f), respectively, show exemplary trajectories of Case 2 and Case 3 with agents starting from
the same locations as in the exemplary trajectory in Fig. 3(b). We can see that in both cases, the
two agents managed to avoid collisions. In Case 2, both agents behaved more conservatively, and
lead to low efficiency (Fig. 3(d)), while in Case 3, both agents behaved as their opponent expected
and generated the most efficient and safe trajectories (Fig. 3(e)). To show the statistical results, we
conducted 100 simulations for each case with randomized initial states, and the RS is shown in
Fig. 3(a) (green). It is shown that similar to what we have observed in the exemplary trajectories,
Case 1 lead to the lowest RS, and Case 3 achieved the highest RS. The RS in Case 2 is in the middle
because though both agents behaved conservatively, the wrong beliefs over the other’s model may
still lead to lower RS compared to Case 3.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 3: (a) Performance comparison between the bounded risk-neutral policies and the risk-sensitive policies.
(b-f) Examples of iterative trajectories ( circular arrow denotes the action “stay"); (b) two risk-neutral quantal
level-1 agents; (c) two risk-sensitive quantal level-1 agents; (d) two risk-neutral quantal level-2 agents; (e) two
risk-sensitive quantal level-2 agents; (f) orange: risk-neutral quantal level-1 agent; blue: risk-neutral quantal
level-2 agent;
Algorithm 3: The inverse learning
algorithm
Input: A demonstration set D and
learning rate η
Output: Learned parameters ω¯.
Initialize ω¯.
while not converged do
Run Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2
Compute demonstration gradient
following:
∇ω¯ = ∑ξ∈D ∂ log (P(ξ|ω¯))∂ω¯ ;
Update the parameters following:
ω¯ = ω¯ + η∇ω¯;
end while
Return: ω¯
Figure 2: The navigation reward maps
(left: agent 1; right: agent 2).
Next, we will see how the risk-sensitive CPT model impacts
such risk-neutral behaviors. As shown in Fig. 3(a), in Case
1, the risk-sensitive policies help significantly improve the RS
of interactions between two quantal level-1 agents, i.e., they
performed less aggressively compared to the risk-neutral case.
This is because that the CPT model makes the quantal level-1
agents underestimate the possibilities of “yielding” from their
opponents, and thus lead to more conservative behaviors with
higher RS. Such a conclusion can be verified by comparing the
exemplary trajectories shown in Fig. 3(b-c). We can see that
compared to the risk-neutral case in Fig. 3(b), under the risk-
sensitive policy, the blue agent decided to yield to the orange
one at the fourth step. At the same time, in Case 2 and Case 3,
the risk-sensitivity measure makes the quantal level-2 agents
overestimate the possibilities of “yielding” from quantal level-1
agents and generate more aggressive behaviors. An exemplary
trajectory is shown in Fig. 3(e). We can see that compared
to the risk-neutral quantal level-2 agent in Fig. 3(d), the risk-
sensitive quantal level-2 agents waited less steps and lead to
collision. Hence, the RS for both Case 2 and Case 3 are reduced
compared to the risk-neutral scenarios, as shown in Fig. 3(a).
6.3 The inverse problem: reward
learning in Bounded Risk-Sensitive Markov Games
In this section, we validate the proposed reward learning al-
gorithm, i.e., Algorithm 3. Namely, we aim to recover the rewards, intelligence levels, and risk
parameters of two interactive agents via observed trajectories from them. We also compare the
learning performance of the proposed inverse learning algorithm with a baseline inverse reward
learning algorithm.
6.3.1 Synthetic expert demonstrations generation
As discussed above, in the inverse problem, we aim to learn the navigation rewards and the CPT
parameter γ of both agents, i.e., ω¯=(γ, (ω1, ω2)) with ω1,2 ∈ R25 without prior information on their
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intelligence levels (we need to infer the intelligence levels simultaneously during the learning based
on (9)). In order to achieve such a goal, we first need to collect some expert demonstrations. We
generate such demonstrations in the navigation environment via the policies derived in the forward
problem. Similarly, for generating the demonstrations, we set the parameters in the CPT model as
γ1,2=0.5 and α1,2=0.7, and let agents with mixed levels of intelligence interact with each other using
the risk-sensitive quantal level-k policies. We randomized the initial conditions (initial positions
and the levels of intelligence) of the agents and collected M=100 such expert demonstrations (i.e.,
paired navigation trajectories). The approximation parameter κ in Q-value approximation (12) is set
to κ = 100 and the learning rate is set to η = 0.0015.
6.3.2 Performance of the proposed reward learning algorithm
Metrics. We evaluate the learning performance via two metrics: 1) the parameter percentage error
(PPE), and 2) the policy loss (PL). The PPE of learned parameters ω¯i is defined as |ω¯i−ω¯∗,i|/|ω¯∗,i|
with ω¯∗,i being the ground-truth value. The PL denotes the error between the ground truth quantal
level-k policies and the policies obtained using the learned reward functions. It is defined as
1
|K×S×Ai|
∑
(k,s,ai)∈K×S×Ai |pi∗,i,kω¯ (s, a) − pi∗,i,kω¯∗ (s, a)| where pi∗,i,kω¯ and pi∗,i,kω¯∗ are, respectively,
the quantal level-k policy of agent i under the learned parameter vector ω¯ and the true vector ω¯∗.
Results. Figure 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) show, respectively, the history of averaged PPE over all parameters
and the PL during learning. The solid lines represent the means from 25 trials and the shaded areas are
the 95% confidence intervals. The PPEs of all parameters are given in Fig. 4(c). We can see that the
proposed inverse learning algorithm can effectively recover both the rewards and the parameter γ in
the CPT model for both agents, with all PPEs smaller than 15%. In addition, in Fig. 4(d), we show the
identification accuracy of the intelligence levels of experts in the data. More specifically, the identified
intelligence level of agent i, i ∈ P , in a demonstration ξi is given by kˆi= arg maxk∈K P(k|ξN−1).
We can see that accuracy ratios of 86% and 92% are achieved for the two agents, respectively. Hence,
the results show that the proposed inverse reward learning algorithm can effectively recover rewards,
risk-parameters and intelligence levels of interactive agents in BRSMGs.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4: (a-b) Averaged PPE and PL w.r.t. training epochs.(c) PPE of learned parameters. (d) Intelligence
level identification accuracy (orange: orange agent; blue: blue agent).
6.3.3 Performance comparison with a baseline Maximum Entropy IRL algorithm
The baseline IRL algorithm. The baseline inverse learning algorithm is a risk-neutral Maximum
Entropy IRL [40] without quantal level-k game settings. Instead, it assumes the agents are following
Stackelberg strategies similar to [30]. More specifically, rather than jointly learning rewards for both
agents as the proposed algorithm, in the baseline IRL algorithm, we conduct inverse reward learning
separately for each agent. In each IRL formulation, the future trajectories of the opponent agent is
assumed to be known, i.e., treating the agent as a leader to the opponent agent.
Metrics. In addition to PPE, we also compare the learned rewards with the ground truth rewards using
two types of statistical correlations: 1) Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) and 2) Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient (SCC). PCC characterizes the linear correlation between the ground
truth rewards and the recovered rewards (higher PCC represents higher linear correlations), and
SCC characterizes the strength and direction of the monotonic relationship between the ground truth
rewards and the recovered rewards (higher SCC represents stronger monotonic relationships).
Results. The performance comparison between the proposed approach and the baseline risk-neutral
Maximum Entropy IRL is shown in Fig. 5. We can see in Fig. 5(a) that the proposed method can
recover more accurate reward values compared to the baseline IRL. This is because the baseline fails
to capture the structure biases caused by risk sensitivity and cognitive limitations. Moreover, Fig. 5(b)
indicates that the reward values recovered by the proposed method have higher linear correlation and
stronger monotonic relationship to the ground-truth rewards. Moreover, with the proposed reward
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learning algorithm, the risk preference and intelligence levels of both agents can be recovered, which
can provide more interpretable human behavior models that can be used to generate more human-like
robotic behaviors in human-robot applications.
7 Conclusion.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Reward learning com-
parison between our method and a
baseline Maximum entropy IRL algo-
rithm. (a) Averaged PPE w.r.t. train-
ing epochs. (b) Statistical correla-
tions between the recovered rewards
and the ground-truth rewards.
In this paper, we investigated a new type of Markov Game, i.e.,
the bounded risk-sensitive Markov Game (BRSMG). The pro-
posed game-theoretic framework made the first attempt to capture
the bounded intelligence, the cognitive bias, and the irrationality
in humans’ reasoning processes by integrating the quantal level-k
iterative reasoning model and the cumulative prospect theory.
Both the forward policy design problem and the inverse reward
learning problem have been addressed with not only theoretical
analysis but also simulation verification in a navigation scenario.
Simulation results show that the behaviors of agents in BRSMG
demonstrate both risk-averse and risk-seeking phenomena, which
are consistent with observations from humans. Moreover, in the
inverse reward learning task, the proposed bounded risk-sensitive
inverse learning algorithm outperforms a baseline risk-neutral
inverse learning algorithm by effectively recovering not only
the more accurate rewards but also the intelligence levels and
the risk-measure parameters of agents given demonstrations of
their interactive behaviors. Therefore, the proposed BRSMG
framework provides a tool to learn interpretable and heteroge-
neous human behavior models which are of critical importance
in human-robot interactions.
8 Broader Impact
Humans always interact with each other and make decisions under uncertainties. To better assist
humans, a better model to capture their interactive behaviors has attracted a great amount of research
efforts in multiple disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science, economics and computer science.
The proposed bounded risk-sensitive Markov Game (BRSMG) framework extends classical Markov
Game to consider more realistic behaviors of humans such as bounded rationality and risk-sensitive
tendency. We investigate how the optimal policies of the BRSMG differ from that of classical Games.
Such a framework aims to provide a better modeling of humans’ interactive behaviors, so that we
can help them make better and more rational investment decisions in markets, we can design more
human-like robots to assist humans in a more efficient and friendly manner, and we can help the
governments to propose better guidance towards public policies (such as the “shelter-in-place" order
and the re-opening guidance for the COVID-19 pandemic) by reasoning about the possible responses
from people.
Similar to all other technologies, a better descriptive model for humans’ interactive behaviors also
face ethical risks. One possible such risk is that the proposed work might make humans more
vulnerable to malicious attacks. For example, someone might be able to more accurately infer your
personal preferences (rewards and risk models) by observing your behaviors and take advantage of it.
Another risk is that though more human-like artificial agents are preferable in terms of efficiency and
less tedious work for humans, they might cause more people lose their jobs in more societal sectors.
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Supplementary Material
A Cumulative Prospect Theory
The cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is a non-expected utility theory that describes the risk-
sensitivity of humans’ decision-making processes. In this section, we illustrate the probability
weighting function and the utility function, specifically when they are using the following functional
forms:
w+(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
, w−(p) =
pδ
(pδ + (1− p)δ)1/δ
, (1)
u(x) =
{
(x)α, if x ≥ 0,
λ(−x)β , otherwise. (2)
In Fig. 6 (a), we show an example of the probability weighting function w+, which describes the
characteristics of humans to deflate high probabilities and inflate low probabilities. In Fig. 6 (b), we
show an example of the utility function u with x0 = 0 as the reference point.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: (a) Probability weighting function w+ with γ = 0.7. (b) Utility function with α = 0.4, β = 0.6, λ =
-1.3.
B The convergence of bounded risk-sensitive policies
In this section, we show the proof of Theorem 1. To begin with, we show two lemmas that facilitate
the proof.
Lemma 1. If a ≥ 1, b ≥ 1, and α ∈ (0, 1], then |aα − bα| ≤ |a− b|.
Proof. First, it is clear that the above argument holds when a = b. Then, without loss of generality,
we assume that a > b. We define a differentiable function f(x) : R → R and f(x) = xα. Then,
following the mean value theorem, we can have f(a)− f(b) = (a− b)f ′(c), where c ∈ (b, a). Note
that f ′(c) = αcα−1 ≤ 1 since α ∈ (0, 1] and c > 1. Then we have f(a)− f(b) ≤ (a− b), and thus
aα − bα ≤ a− b holds. Similarly, we have bα − aα ≤ b− a if a < b. 
Lemma 2. Assume that
∑
a−i∈A−i ρ
i(ca
−i
s,ai) ≤ 1. Then, the Bellman operator BV i,km (s) =
maxai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−iρ
i(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i
(
Ri(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V i,km (s
′)
)
defined in (8) in Section 3.2 of the
submitted manuscript is a γ˜-contraction mapping when Rmin satisfies Rmin ≥ 1. That is, for any two
value function estimates V i,k1 and V
i,k
2 , we have
max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣BV i,k1 (s)− BV i,k2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ˜maxs∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s)− V i,k2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣. (3)
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Proof. Define ri1,2(c
a−i
s,ai) = R
i(s, ai, a−i)+γ˜V i,k1,2 (s
′), then, we can write∣∣∣∣∣BV i,k1 (s)− BV i,k2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ maxai∈Ai ∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(ri(ca−is,ai))− max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(ri(ca−is,ai))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
ai∈Ai
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(ri(ca
−i
s,ai))−
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(ri(ca−is,ai))
∣∣∣∣∣ (4a)
≤ max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ui(ri1(ca−is,ai))− ui(ri2(ca−is,ai))
∣∣∣∣∣ (4b)
≤ max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ri1(ca−is,ai)− ri2(ca−is,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ (4c)
≤ max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣γ˜V i,k1 (s′)− γ˜V i,k2 (s′)
∣∣∣∣∣ (4d)
= max
ai∈Ai
γ˜
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s′)− V i,k2 (s′)
∣∣∣∣∣. (4e)
Note that the inequality (4)(c) holds based on the definition of ui defined in Section 2.3 of the
submitted manuscript, namely, ui(x) = xα, x ≥ 0, α ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, we have ri(1,2)(ca
−i
s,ai) =
Ri(s, ai, a−i,n) + γ˜V i,k(1,2)(s
′) > Rmin ≥ 1. With Lemma 1, we have (4)(c). Hence,
max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣BV i,k1 (s)− BV i,k2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxs∈S maxai∈Ai γ˜ ∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s′)− V i,k2 (s′)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
s∈S
max
ai∈Ai
γ˜
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai) max
s′′
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s′′)− V i,k2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣
= γ˜max
s′′
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s′′)− V i,k2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣maxs∈S maxai∈Ai ∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)
≤ γ˜max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,k1 (s)− V i,k2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣. (5a)
Note that the inequality (5a) holds since
∑
a−i∈A−i ρ
i(ca
−i
s,ai) ≤ 1 as defined in the condition.
Proceeding in this way, we conclude that the operator B is a γ˜-contraction mapping. 
Now, we restate Theorem 1 in the submitted manuscript and show its proof.
Theorem 1. Define the tuple 〈s, ai, a−i〉:=ca−is,ai and normalize the transformed probabilities
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai):=ρ˜
i(P(a−i|s, ai)) by
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai) =
{
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai)/maxai
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai), if k = 1,
ρ˜i(ca
−i
s,ai)/
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai), otherwise.
(6)
For an arbitrary agent i∈P , if the one-step reward Ri is lower-bounded by Rmin with Rmin ≥ 1, then∀s ∈ S and all intelligence levels with k=1, 2, · · · , the dynamic programming problem in (5) of the
submitted manuscript can be solved by the following value iteration algorithm:
V i,km+1(s) = max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
ρi(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(Ri(s, ai, a−i)+γ˜V i,km (s′))), s′ = T (s, ai, a−i). (7)
Moreover, as m→∞, V i,km+1 converges to the optimal value function V ∗,i,k(s).
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction.
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When k=1, pi∗,−i,k−1=pi−i,0, which is defined in (3) (Definition 2) in the submitted manuscript.
Hence, the dynamic programming problem defined in (5) in the submitted manuscript reduces to a
single-agent policy optimization problem since the anchoring policy is known and (5) can be expressed
as V ∗,i,1(s) = BV ∗,i,1(s). Moreover, (6) guarantees that the assumption ∑a−i∈A−i ρi(ca−is,ai) ≤ 1
in Lemma 2 holds. Hence, according to Lemma 2, we have
max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,1m+1(s)− V ∗,i,1(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ = maxs∈S
∣∣∣∣∣BV i,1m (s)− BV ∗,i,1(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γ˜max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,1m (s)− V ∗,i,1(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
= γ˜max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣BV i,1m−1(s)− BV ∗,i,1(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γ˜2 max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,1m−1(s)− V ∗,i,1(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
...
≤ γ˜m max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V i,11 (s)− V ∗,i,k(s)
∣∣∣∣∣, (8)
and it is clear that V i,1m → V ∗,i,1 as m→∞. Hence, when k = 1, the algorithm in (7) can solve for
the optimal CPT value and the policy pi∗,i,1 can be obtained for all i ∈ P . Note that pi∗,i,1 depends
on i’s intelligence level.
Next, we will show that for any k′ ∈ N+ and k′ > 1, assuming the convergence of V ∗,i,k′−1 is
proved and the policy pi∗,i,k
′−1 is obtained for all i ∈ P , then, similar to (8), we have V i,k′m → V ∗,i,k
′
as m→∞.
Again, with the above assumption on V ∗,i,k
′−1 and pi∗,i,k
′−1, we can see that the dynamic program-
ming problem defined in (5) in the submitted manuscript has been reduced to a single-agent optimal
policy optimization problem since the opponent’s policy pi∗,−i,k
′−1 is already solved for and thus
only depends on agent −i’s intelligence level. Moreover, (6) assures that∑a−i∈A−i ρi(ca−is,ai)=1 for
k′ > 1, satisfying the assumption in Lemma 2. Hence, via the conclusion from Lemma 2 and (8),
we can see that V ∗,i,k
′
can be solved by the algorithm in (7). The policy pi∗,i,k
′
can also be obtained
correspondingly for all i ∈ P .
Hence, we have proved that argument in Theorem 1 holds. 
C Detailed Derivations in the Inverse Learning Problem
In this section, we show some detailed derivations that needed to compute the gradient of the objective
function in (9) in the submitted manuscript.
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C.1 Derivation of the gradient of the log-likelihood of a demonstration
In this subsection, we show the derivation of the gradient of the log-likelihood of a demonstration.
Recall (10) in the submitted manuscript, we can write
∂ log
(
P(ξ|ω¯))
∂ω¯
=
N−1∑
t=0
1
Pt
∂Pt
∂ω¯
, (9a)
Pt :=
∑
(ki,k−i)∈K×K
pi∗,i,kω¯ (st, a
i
t)pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ (st, a
−i
t )P(k
i|ξt−1, ω¯)P(k−i|ξt−1, ω¯), (9b)
∂Pt
∂ω¯
=
∑
(ki,k−i)∈K×K
(∂pi∗,i,kω¯
∂ω¯
(st, a
i
t)pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ (st, a
−i
t )P(k
i|ξt−1, ω¯)P(k−i|ξt−1, ω¯)
+ pi∗,i,kω¯ (st, a
i
t)
∂pi∗,−i,k
−i
ω¯
∂ω¯
(st, a
−i
t )P(k
i|ξt−1, ω¯)P(k−i|ξt−1, ω¯)
+ pi∗,i,kω¯ (st, a
i
t)pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ (st, a
−i
t )
∂P(ki|ξt−1, ω¯)
∂ω¯
P(k−i|ξt−1, ω¯)
+ pi∗,i,kω¯ (st, a
i
t)pi
∗,−i,k−i
ω¯ (st, a
−i
t )P(k
i|ξt−1, ω¯)∂P(k
−i|ξt−1, ω¯)
∂ω¯
)
. (9c)
C.2 Supporting derivations for the gradient of policies in Section 4.2.1 in the submitted
manuscript
In this subsection, we show the derivation of ∂ρ
i
ω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai) which is required in Theorem 2 in the
submitted manuscript to compute the gradient of policies.
Recall (7) in the submitted manuscript, we can compute ∂ρ
i
ω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai) as follows:
∂ρiω¯
∂ω¯
(ca
−i
s,ai) =

∂ρ˜iω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai
) maxai
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)−ρ˜iω¯(ca
−i
s,ai
)
∂max
ai
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)
∂ω(
maxai
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)
)2 , if k = 1,
∂ρ˜iω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai
)
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)−ρ˜iω¯(ca
−i
s,ai
)
∂
∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)
∂ω(∑
a−i ρ˜
i(ca
−i
s,ai
)
)2 , if k > 1.
(10)
It can be observed that (10) only depends on ∂ρ˜
i
ω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai), and the treatment for the max operator
follows the smooth approximation method used in (12) in Section 4.2.1 of the submitted manuscript.
Next, we will show how to compute ∂ρ˜
i
ω¯
∂ω¯ (c
a−i
s,ai).
Note that based on the CPT model defined in (2) in the submitted manuscript, ρ˜iω¯(c
a−i
s,ai) is a transform
of the probability that agent −i takes the action a−i given current state s (and the action ai from
agent i if k = 1, i.e., pi∗,−i,0(s, a−i, ai), since the anchoring policy depends on the actions from
both agents). Without loss of generality, we assume that all NA = |A−i| utilities induced by agent
−i’s possible actions are ordered in increasing order, i.e., 0 ≤ ri(ca
−i
1
s,ai) ≤ · · · ≤ ri(c
a−iNA
s,ai ), where
ri(ca
−i
s,ai) = u
i
(
Ri(s, ai, a−i)+γ˜V ∗,i,k(s′))
)
. Then recall (2b) in the submitted manuscript (since all
rewards are positive), for any g ∈ {1, . . . , NA}, we define
p1(c
a−ig
s,ai
) =
{∑NA
j=g pi
∗,−i,k−1
ω¯ (s, a
−i
j , a
i), k = 1∑NA
j=g pi
∗,−i,k−1
ω¯ (s, a
−i
j ), k > 1
, (11a)
p2(c
a−ig
s,ai
) =
{∑NA
j=g+1 pi
∗,−i,k−1
ω¯ (s, a
−i
j , a
−i
j ), k = 1∑NA
j=g+1 pi
∗,−i,k−1
ω¯ (s, a
−i
j ), k > 1
, (11b)
then we have ρ˜iω¯(c
a−ig
s,ai) = w
i,+(p1)− wi,+(p2).
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Note that both wi,+, p1 and p2 depend on the parameter γi since γi ∈ ω¯, but only p1 and p2 depend
on the parameter ω¯−γ
i
(note that ω¯−γ
i , ω¯ \ {γi}), thus we compute ∂ρ˜iω¯∂γi and ∂ρ˜
i,n
ω¯
∂ω¯−γi
separately:
∂ρ˜iω¯
∂γi
(c
a−ig
s,ai) = Φ
1 − Φ2, (12a)
Φj = wi,+(pj)
(
log(pj) +
γi
pj
∂pj
∂γi
(c
a−ig
s,ai) +
log
(
(pj)γ
i
+ (1− pj)γi)
(γi)2
−
(pj)γ
i(
log(pj) + γ
i
pj
∂pj
∂γi (c
a−ig
s,ai)
)
+ (1− pj)γi( log(1− pj)− γi1−pj ∂pj∂γi (ca−igs,ai))
γi
(
(pj)γi + (1− pj)γi) ),
j = 1, 2, (12b)
∂ρ˜i,nω¯
∂ω¯−γi
(c
a−ig
s,ai) = w
′(+)
p (p
1)
∂p1
∂ω¯−γi
(c
a−ig
s,ai)− w′(+)p (p2)
∂p2
∂ω¯−γi
(c
a−ig
s,ai), (12c)
where ∂p
(1,2)
∂ω¯ (c
a−ig
s,ai) =
{∑NA
j=(g,g+1)
∂pi∗,−i,0ω¯
∂ω¯ (s, a
−i
g , a
i), k = 1∑NA
j=(g,g+1)
∂pi∗,−i,k−1ω¯
∂ω¯ (s, a
−i
g ), k > 1
, w′(+)p is the partial derivative
with respect to the variables p and can be computed straightforwardly based on the functional form
w+(p) defined in Section 2.3 of the submitted manuscript (or (1) in this supplementary material).
∂pi∗,−i,0ω¯
∂ω¯ can be computed straightforwardly based on the definition of the anchoring policy ((3) in the
submitted manuscript). The item ∂pi
∗,−i,k−1
ω¯
∂ω¯ for k > 1 is already known, since we compute
∂pi∗,i,kω¯
∂ω¯
iteratively and sequentially for k = 1, 2, . . . , kmax and for i ∈ P as shown in Algorithm 2 in the
submitted manuscript.
D The Convergence of Value Gradient
In this section, we show the proof of Theorem 2. To begin with, we first restate Theorem 2 as follows:
Theorem 2. If the one-step reward Ri, i ∈ P , is bounded by Ri∈[Rmin, Rmax] satisfying RmaxR2−αmin αγ˜<1,
then ∂V ∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯ can be found via the following value gradient iteration:
V
′,i,k
ω¯,m+1(s) ≈
1
κ
(∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1−κκ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
κ
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
·Q′,i,kω¯,m(s, ai)
]
, (13a)
Q
′,i,k
ω¯,m(s, a
i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
∂ρiω¯
∂ω¯
(ca
−i
s,ai)u
i(Ri(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s′))
+ ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai)α
(
Riω¯(s, a
i, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s
′)
)α−1(∂Riω¯
∂ω¯
(s, ai, a−i) + γ˜V
′,i,k
ω¯,m (s
′)
))
. (13b)
Moreover, the algorithm converges to ∂V ∗,i,kω¯ /∂ω¯ as m→∞.
To prove Theorem 2, we begin with several lemmas that facilitate the proof.
Lemma 3. When u+(x) = xα, CPT(x) = u+()CPT(x),∀ > 0,∀x ≥ 0.
Proof. Based on the definition of the CPT measure ((1) in the submitted manuscript), we can write
(note that we only consider u+ since we consider positive rewards)
CPT(x) =
∫ ∞
0
w+
(
P
(
u+(x) > y
))
dy =
∫ ∞
0
w+
(
P
(
u+(x) >
y
u+()
))
dy. (14)
We let z := yu+() , then we have dy = u
+()dz, and
CPT(x) = u+()
∫ ∞
0
w+
(
P
(
u+(x) > z
))
dz = u+()CPT(x). (15)

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Lemma 4. For an arbitrary agent i ∈ P , if i’s one-step reward is lower-bounded by Rmin and
upper-bounded by Rmax, then ∀k ∈ N+, we have V i,kmax ≤ RmaxRmin V
i,k
min .
Proof. We define θ = RmaxRmin , then according to (4) in the submitted manuscript, V
i,k
max can only be
achieved if agent i collects the maximum one-step reward at every step. Similarly, V i,kmin can only be
achieved if agent i collects the minimum one-step reward at every step. Hence, we have
V i,kmax = CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmax + γ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmax + . . .
]]
= CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin + γ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin + . . .
]]
. (16)
Since CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin
]
= ui(θ)CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmin
]
≤ θCPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmin
]
based on
Lemma 3 and the fact that ui(θ) = u+(θ) = θα ≤ θ, then we can have
V i,kmax = CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin + γ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin + . . .
]]
≤ CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
θRmin + θγ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmin + . . .
]]
≤ θCPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmin + γ˜CPTpi∗,−i,k−1
[
Rmin + . . .
]]
=
Rmax
Rmin
V i,kmin . (17)

Lemma 5. Recall (13)(a) in Theorem 2 in this supporting material, we define an operator
∇BV ′,i,km = V
′,i,k
m+1, ∀i,∈ P , ∀k ∈ N+. Then, the operator ∇B is a γ¯-contraction mapping if
the one-step reward Ri is bounded by Ri ∈ [Rmin, Rmax] satisfying γ¯ = RmaxR2−αmin αγ˜<1, that is, for any
value function gradient estimates V
′,i,k
ω¯,1 and V
′,i,k
ω¯,2 , we have
max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣∇BV ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)−∇BV ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ¯maxs∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣. (18)
19
Proof. Recall (13)(a) in this supporting material, we can write
∣∣∣∣∣∇BV ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)−∇BV ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1κ
( ∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1−κκ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
κ
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1(
Q
′,i,k
ω¯,1 (s, a
i)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai)
)]∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
1
κ
( ∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1−κκ
κ
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1(
Q
′,i,k
ω¯,1 (s, a
i)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai)
)]∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ai∈Ai
[( ∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ) 1κ (Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai))κ−1∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ (Q′,i,kω¯,1 (s, ai)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai))
]∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
V ∗,i,k(s)
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ (Q′,i,kω¯,1 (s, ai)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai))
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
ai∈Ai
[
V ∗,i,k(s)
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ
∣∣∣∣∣Q′,i,kω¯,1 (s, ai)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
. (19)
Recall (13)(b) in this supplementary material, we can have
∣∣∣∣∣Q′,i,kω¯,1 (s, ai)−Q′,i,kω¯,2 (s, ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a−i∈A−i
(
ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai)α
(
Riω¯(s, a
i, a−i) + γ˜V ∗,i,kω¯ (s
′)
)α−1
γ˜
(
V
′,i,k
ω¯,1 (s
′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′)
))∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γ˜α(Rmin + γ˜V ∗,i,kmin )α−1
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai)
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
(20a)
≤ max
s′′∈S
γ˜αRminα−1
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a−i∈A−i
ρiω¯(c
a−i
s,ai) (20b)
≤ max
s′′∈S
γ˜αRα−1min
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣. (20c)
Note that the inequality (20)(c) holds since
∑
a−i∈A−i ρ
i
ω¯(c
a−i
s,ai) ≤ 1, which is governed by (7) in the submitted
manuscript. We substitute (20) into (19), then we have
∣∣∣∣∣∇BV ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)−∇BV ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
ai∈Ai
[
V ∗,i,k(s)
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ max
s′′∈S
γ˜αRα−1min
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= max
s′′∈S
γ˜αRminα−1
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ai∈Ai
V ∗,i,k(s)
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ .
(21)
20
Also note that
∑
ai∈Ai
V ∗,i,k(s)
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ ≤ ∑
ai∈Ai
V ∗,i,kmax
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ (22a)
≤
∑
ai∈Ai
Rmax
Rmin
V ∗,i,kmin
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ (22b)
=
Rmax
Rmin
∑
ai∈Ai V
∗,i,k
min
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)κ (22c)
≤ Rmax
Rmin
. (22d)
Note that the inequality (22) (b) holds based on Lemma 4. Moreover, inequality (22)(d) holds since∑
ai∈Ai
V ∗,i,kmin
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1
−
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ
=
∑
ai∈Ai
(
Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, a
i)
)κ−1(
V ∗,i,kmin −Q∗,i,kω¯ (s, ai)
)
(23)
≤ 0. (24)
Now, we substitute (22) into (21), and then we can write
max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣∇BV ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)−∇BV ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxs′′∈S γ˜αRα−1min
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s′′)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s′′)
∣∣∣∣∣maxs∈S RmaxRmin
=
Rmax
R2−αmin
αγ˜max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣V ′,i,kω¯,1 (s)− V ′,i,kω¯,2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣. (25)
Proceeding in this way, we conclude that the operator∇B is a γ¯-contraction mapping, where γ¯= Rmax
R2−αmin
αγ˜<1.

Now, we show the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. We first define ∇BV ′,i,km = V
′,i,k
m+1, and then Lemma 5 shows that the operator ∇B is a
contraction under the given conditions. Then, the statement is proved by induction in a similar way
as for Theorem 1, and thus is omitted. 
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